



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, AND SEVENTH ARMY
UNIT 29351
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S: 22 September 2006

21 August 2006

AEAGA-S

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Army in Europe Winter 2006-2007 *Own the Edge* Campaign

This memorandum expires 1 May 2007.

1. REFERENCES

The enclosure lists references.

2. PURPOSE

This memorandum provides the Army in Europe Winter 2006-2007 *Own the Edge* Campaign, which will run from 1 October 2006 through 30 April 2007. This campaign continues the loss-prevention efforts of previous campaigns, but is more sharply focused than its predecessors.

a. We continue to lose valuable personnel to avoidable accidents. As I examine our losses, human performance appears to be the main factor. Of the four performance-adjustment factors—ability, knowledge, motivation, and skills—motivation, or the lack of it, is the recurring root cause of accidents. Historically, we have considered this as either indiscipline or a failure to follow standards. This perspective is valid. However, if we limit our accident causation view to this perspective, we will not drive the rate downward. We must do more. I firmly believe that leader influence is the key to reducing losses in the future.

b. We know that off-duty activities are our number-one killer. Therefore, the primary intent of this campaign is to improve our mentoring of the at-risk population, and to target the motivation and associated emotions of our Soldiers. The concept of “buy in” (to recognize an issue and take ownership of the problem) is central to behavioral change, and the method we use is Under the Oak Tree counseling. I also intend to integrate these initiatives within mission areas to ensure one comprehensive composite risk management (CRM) program.

c. I am limiting the number of outside tasks normally associated with a winter campaign in order to place maximum concentration on improving our ability to influence those in our charge. The absence of specific requirements in this campaign, however, does not relieve commands of preparing for the winter and cold weather or conducting risk-management tasks.

3. EXECUTION

a. Plan.

(1) I am accountable to the Chief of Staff of the Army and have given him my plan for establishing a culture where—

- Safety measures are visible but do not make Soldiers averse to risk.
- The command actively manages tactical and accidental risk.

This memorandum is available at <https://www.aeaim.hqusareur.army.mil/library/>.

- Leaders are accountable for their programs.
- Executable plans are developed and require leader involvement.
- CRM is incorporated in all activities, operations, training, and off-duty activities.

(2) Our policy and previous safety campaigns have brought us accolades. However, our loss-reduction efforts have brought us to a plateau. Since fiscal year 2002 (FY 02), our fatalities have generally decreased. However, as we approach the end of FY 06, our fatalities are equal to those of FY 05. To continue reducing the number of fatalities, we need to reassess our climate in relation to our evolving culture and our ability to exert meaningful influence on risk-management decisions.

b. Climate and Culture. The DOD Inspector General safety awareness survey 2 years ago made it clear to our leadership that an Army-wide disparity exists between the way leaders and subordinates view the success of risk-management programs. Leaders are convinced that what we do is on target and working. Subordinates, however, are not so convinced. This is important to understand because climate and culture strongly influence our ability to communicate and resolve risks, both during Under the Oak Tree counseling and when planning and executing missions. We should be very concerned about getting adequate feedback across a wide spectrum of program indicators and use that feedback to adjust our programs.

(1) ARAP. The United States Army Combat Readiness Center (USACRC) has embraced this challenge and assembled the Army Readiness Assessment Program (ARAP) for battalion commanders (<https://unitready.army.mil/>). ARAP uses anonymous, web-based questionnaires to give battalion commanders a real picture of how their subordinates view their risk-management programs. The USACRC compiles the results and provides them to the commander, along with one-on-one expert advice and recommendations.

(a) I require battalion commanders to use the ARAP, because it has proven successful in two ways: First, it is predictive. A battalion scoring in the bottom quartile is four times more likely to have a catastrophic accident. Second, the data analysis provides a sharp picture on the state of the command. Strengths and weaknesses can be efficiently assessed and specific challenges targeted.

(b) This process also facilitates a quantum leap in risk reduction, because Soldiers can see that they have a say in shaping the command risk-management program. It establishes credibility. Because the ARAP gets to the root causes, I am convinced that this program will efficiently reduce accidental losses. I am also convinced that the degree to which new battalion commanders stay on track with the risk-assessment schedule will have a direct effect on our loss-reduction efforts.

(c) It is not my intent to force this process on current commanders who are outside their initial 90-day or mid-term window. A “shotgun” approach degrades the importance of the established timing, overwhelms the analysis capability, and reduces effectiveness.

(2) Under the Oak Tree Counseling. Under the Oak Tree counseling is a vital culture-changing tool. It is the “tip of the spear” when it comes to altering off-duty behavior. This technique is also valuable for altering on-duty behavior. As stated earlier, motivation is the root cause of most of our serious high-risk losses. The Army has observed the same trend. West Point independently made a human-factors analysis of more than 10,000 vehicle accidents. Its study concluded that “motivation is the hazard that accumulates the most severity and the greatest severity per accident.” Therefore, we need to improve our ability to discuss risk and motivate behavioral modification. As I said previously, we must not limit ourselves to thinking that accidents are caused by indiscipline. Instead, we must engage in logical discussion that allows the Soldier to conclude that different thinking is required. We will not get any better until our first-line leaders master that communication process. We need to practice and share successful communication techniques.

(3) ASMIS-2. The USACRC’s interactive, web-based, privately owned vehicle (POV) trip-assessment tool, the Army Safety Management Information System (ASMIS)-2 (<https://crc.army.mil/includes/tabbeddisplay.html>), accomplishes the key Oak Tree objectives for drivers and first-line leaders. It makes drivers think through their trip, points out risk-elevating factors, and shows how lives have been lost under similar trip conditions. It makes drivers realize that the same thing can happen to them, which is fundamental to changing their behavior.

(a) ASMIS-2 first establishes a baseline fatality risk based on the crash-worthiness of the vehicle type. From there, various other factors are added or subtracted based on driver responses. Throughout the process, directly applicable sound bites are absorbed and opportunities are given to reassess responses based on the facts. The 10 minutes it takes to complete the assessment results in drivers being educated on trip-specific risks and ready for a meaningful discussion with their supervisor. Supervisors also receive an assessment summary, which allows them to consider the risks associated with the trip in light of personal knowledge of the drivers. Reviewing the summary takes less than a minute. This is a major enhancement to the Under the Oak Tree process, and it works. Since 1 December 2005, 450,000 assessments have been conducted across the Army with only 3 subsequent fatalities.

(b) ASMIS-2 also provides maps and directions from the point of origin to the final destination, as well as military leave documentation. The user gets something tangible in addition to valuable information. Unfortunately, the program’s European mapping interface is weak, which means the program may not recognize the origin or destination point. This may affect some risk-assessment recommendations, such as when to take rest breaks. Knowing of this challenge, however, allows us to compensate for it. Overall, ASMIS-2 is on target and an excellent enhancement to our risk-management programs. Therefore, effective immediately, use of the ASMIS-2 assessment tool is mandatory for personnel of all grades. The following will be approved only on successful completion of an ASMIS-2 assessment and driver-supervisor review:

1. Requests for military leaves and passes from Soldiers who plan to operate a POV, motorcycle, or rental vehicle outside a 150-mile radius of their unit (which equals 2 hours on the autobahn).

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2. Military and DA civilian official travel when a transportation motor pool (TMP) Interagency Fleet Management System (IFMS) passenger vehicle, POV, motorcycle, or rental vehicle is authorized for use outside the garrison where the travel starts.

(c) Mission risk assessments performed for operations involving IFMS passenger vehicles should be supplemented using the ASMIS-2 assessment tool when determined to be advantageous.

(d) The USAREUR G1 will modify Army in Europe Command Policy Letter 3 to incorporate the ASMIS-2 requirement. Tips for maximizing success are available on the USAREUR Safety webpage (http://www.per.hqusareur.army.mil/services/safetydivision/Winter%20Safety/campaign%2006%2007/Winter_OTE_Campaign.htm).

c. Composite Risk Management. We must embrace the *Own the Edge* campaign (<https://cra.army.mil/oteadkit/>) and the philosophy of the new FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management. *Own the Edge* brings to mind a powerful image of being able to operate with some degree of risk, but knowing where the boundary is and how close to it you can get. A powerful teaching capability comes as a result of that image. Other aspects of CRM are discussed elsewhere in this memorandum.

d. Executable Plans. Under risk-management step 4, *Implement control measures*, we need to teach our subordinates that they must be as specific and realistic as possible, as time and conditions permit, when planning missions and assigning responsibilities. This function is completely integrated with mission planning and teamwork. This campaign is a result of CRM and the need for a tailored, executable plan. The culmination of the Under the Oak Tree process should also be an executable plan. Every assessment must end with some degree of an executable plan.

(1) I am concerned that we are tempted to terminate the risk-management process at the point of developing control measures (step 3). Some would call it *checking the block* ("Yes, sir, we did a risk assessment."). The assessor should go through the thought process and share it with leaders, but we must ensure that our subordinates take it to the next step. There must be a plan that encompasses knowledge, ability, and materiel, and assigns responsibility.

(2) We must ensure our subordinates understand that, regardless of the command level at which the assessment takes place, following through with a tailored plan minimizes the chance of being "taken out of the fight." The process loop is a continuous, five-step assessment, and the thinking and decision skills apply on and off the job. If we can make the simple five-step thought process a fundamental part of all decisionmaking, we will improve our readiness and well-being, and we will be successful leaders.

e. Leader Accountability. The Summer Campaign paralleled the release of MILPER Message 06-035. Both required leaders to include safety program goals and tasks on their evaluation support forms, developmental support forms, and noncommissioned officer (NCO) evaluation report counseling checklists and records for consideration by rating officials during final evaluations. We must continue to share goals with our leaders and subordinates and ensure that agreed on, positive steps are being taken. ARAP evaluation results are a great source of improvement goals. And as leader goals are vertically aligned, they will automatically improve the Army in Europe risk posture.

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f. Leading-Indicator Summary Reports. I am establishing a requirement for summary reports for two leading indicators: maintenance of unit safety certification and application of the ARAP. I intend to use these metrics to determine if commanders are actively engaging their subordinates to improve their risk environment, and maintenance of their risk-management knowledge base. The USAREUR G1 will incorporate these metrics into the Strategic Management System and modify existing lagging-indicator reports as necessary. Leading-indicator summary reports must be given to the USAREUR G1 (AEAGA-S) on the first day of each quarter. Paragraph 7a(9) provides more information.

4. OWN THE EDGE PROGRAM

Own the Edge is more than just a DA-level campaign. I have used *Own the Edge* concepts in my McKiernan Sends messages, beginning with McKiernan Sends Message #10-06. I want to fully engage these concepts in this campaign.

a. As we transition and adapt to changing conditions in the Global War on Terrorism, we have adopted a goal of developing flexible and adaptive leaders. *Owning the Edge*, as I wish to implement it, is all about adapting to a changing environment. The USACRC's *Own the Edge* program provides a gateway to introduce and reinforce CRM. Leaders and Soldiers must be able to adapt to their environment, both on and off the job. This is just as important as a warfighting capability as it is a life skill. Rules are rigid, and those who live only by rules are at risk of failure in a rapidly evolving environment. Do not misinterpret what I am saying; we will always have rules and those with a regulatory or legal basis must be obeyed. However, those who understand the origin of the rules can immediately adapt and apply concepts to develop courses of action based on "what's right" for the situation.

b. The Director of Army Safety has been working hard to determine the viewpoints and emotional motivators of our younger Soldiers, and tells us that we must recognize a serious difference between the levels of acceptable risk for mature leaders and for younger Soldiers. Some very good material has been posted on USACRC webpages and in USACRC publications about this. We need to study that material, change the way we think about risk, and change the way we discuss risk. At present, we are failing to communicate. I ask you to view the video on rock climbing at <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-249413429042618169>. What was your overall reaction? I suspect that it was radically different from the "Awesome!" reaction of the younger troops. We must acknowledge that this difference in perception is a root cause of risk-communication failure. Once we recognize the challenge, we can begin to deal with it.

c. According to the Director of Army Safety, success results from establishing credibility and respect. This takes us back to the essence of how to improve our Under the Oak Tree process. One's grade or position in the chain of command may demand respect, but success requires a personal, two-way respect between individuals. Once that is established, subordinates need facts, not opinions. They need to see that the discussion is relevant and logical, and that it allows them to logically draw conclusions about the costs versus benefits. If the risks can be associated with someone they know or idolize, it will be easier for them to conclude that the same risks apply to them. At that point, additional discussion can take place on what to do about the risks. Ensure that your first-line leaders are mentored in this enhanced "buy in" and commitment process. This will result in individuals self-policing their risky behavior and helping others to do the same.

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d. The new FM 5-19 is an integrated United States Army Training and Doctrine Command document that improves on the old FM 100-14. All operational risk-management training should be transitioned to the new field manual. As mentioned above, the Director of Army Safety has been observing systemic failures in the execution of the risk-management process. Two key repeating execution failures are linked to step 1, *Identify hazards*, and step 4, *Implement control measures*. When executing step 1, leaders must be as comprehensive as time and conditions permit. They must consider all sources of potential loss. The resulting information establishes a high probability of addressing the right risks in the subsequent assessment steps and minimizes the time spent on extraneous issues. This applies to the Under the Oak Tree process as well to all mission assessments. The failures in step 4 were addressed in paragraph 3d. As stated earlier, there must be a plan and an execution in order to reduce risk. I ask you to ensure that your leaders ask questions about this during Under the Oak Tree sessions as well as during all mission assessments. As we repetitively ask these questions, institutionalization will occur, and our troops will begin to ask the same tough questions themselves.

5. AWARDS

As much as possible, I ask you to use positive reinforcement to improve motivation and change behavior. The standard awards in AR 672-74, as updated by ALARAC Message 069-2006, and AR 672-20 and AE Supplement 1 should be supplemented with leader recognition in meaningful ways, based on the accomplishment and the specific situation. Excellence in accomplishments or competitions that clearly contribute to the increased effectiveness or efficiency of the unit may also be recognized through the military awards program in AR 600-8-22, chapter 11. Because of recent rulings against using appropriated funds for “giveaways,” commanders must ensure that subordinates obtain a legal opinion before purchasing award materials.

6. CURRENT ASSESSMENT

a. At-Risk Population. Our at-risk population is changing and we need to adjust our techniques to intervene. As of 1 August 2006, half of our FY 06 accidental fatalities have been NCOs. This tells me that we must include our NCOs in one-on-one Under the Oak Tree counseling.

b. Fatality Rate Trend. Figure 1 reinforces our significant improvement since 2001. This reveals the following:

- (1) Improvement is possible with leader involvement.
- (2) Although our program has been effective, it has hit a plateau. History shows that breaching a plateau requires improved tactics.




Figure 1. USAREUR Fatality Rate Trend by Fiscal Year (FY 06 as of 14 August 2006)

c. On Versus Off Duty. The trend continues to show that the vast majority of our accidental fatalities occurred off duty. In 2001, 28 percent of our fatalities occurred on duty. In the last 2 years, we have averaged one on-duty fatality per year. Our on-the-job CRM is working; however, we must improve our ability to influence the behavior of personnel when they are off duty.

d. Who Is At Risk?

(1) Average Fatality. Overall, the average age of accidental death in 2001 was 26 and the grade was specialist. In 2005 and the current fiscal year, the average age jumped to 30 years old and the grade rose to sergeant. This is significant. Given that our fatalities are occurring off duty, our NCOs need the same caring, two-way discussions in Under the Oak Tree counseling.

(2) Male Versus Female. Historically, our fatalities have been male. We have had no female accidental deaths over the past 2 years.

(3) POVs and Motorcycles. In 2001, there were no motorcycle fatalities in the Army in Europe. Across the Army, there were only 15 motorcycle fatalities. Last year, a smaller Army had 40 motorcycle fatalities. This is the only Army fatality statistic that is higher now than it was last year. In FY 05, the Army in Europe saw a new trend: more Soldiers died in motorcycle crashes in FY 05

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than in POV accidents. So far this fiscal year, the count is the same. Our average POV fatality is a 28-year-old male specialist. This is up from 2001, when our average POV fatality was a 24-year-old male private first class. The FY 06 motorcycle fatalities are older and higher in grade: a 35-year-old male sergeant first class.

e. What Is the Risk?

(1) Motorcycles. Our garrison-hosted Motorcycle Safety Foundation training is teaching lifesaving skills. Our licensing requirements are ensuring that riders are licensed. With few exceptions, our recent crashes have involved people who were properly trained and licensed. However, we continue to see riders passing into oncoming traffic and riding too fast for conditions. This is a performance-based issue. Given that knowledge and skills meet minimum standards, the main problem is individual motivation and emotions while off duty. These were also factors when alcohol was involved. As mentioned above, we must include NCOs in the Under the Oak Tree communication process. We must also improve our Under the Oak Tree leader knowledge of subordinates as well as our risk-communication skills so that we can influence our subordinates' off-duty motivation and emotions. The traffic-point assessment and recordkeeping procedures of AE Regulation 190-1 should be used to help assess individual risk.

(2) POVs. Once again, the indicators are performance-based. Although our personnel are licensed, we do not yet have a process to evaluate or teach basic skills. We need to institute a driver-training process and are waiting for the establishment of the Garrison Army Driver Training Program to baseline knowledge and skills. Several alternatives are currently working in case this program is not established. Implementation will be the subject of separate direction. To accelerate reduction of the current trend, we must improve our Under the Oak Tree communication to influence off-duty motivation. The ASMIS-2 POV web-based assessment tool will be used to help with communication. The traffic-point assessment and recordkeeping procedures of AE Regulation 190-1 should be used to help assess individual risk.

f. Other Non-Fatal Accidents.

(1) Aviation. Aviation operations have not resulted in fatalities since an Apache crew perished in a Balkans wire strike in FY 03. However, the threat to our Soldiers and equipment is still present. This year, an Apache crew survived ingestion of part of a hangar into its rotor system, and another Apache crew survived impact with an approach-light tower. Both of these accidents were near misses and both had human error as the root cause. A Blackhawk survived an airborne lightning strike and another was destroyed by high winds on the ground. Together, these incidents cost us \$2.4 million. Aviation is a dangerous business. Focused, trained, and engaged personnel are sometimes the only difference between an incident and a major accident.

(2) Ground Injuries.

(a) Injuries that result in lost military and civilian time on the job rob us of productivity and mission readiness. We must do better in identifying and eliminating root causes to prevent these

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losses. We are still under-reporting incidents that meet the AR 385-40 definition of Army accident and as required by AE Regulation 385-40. So far in FY 06, fewer than 100 total USAREUR Class B and C accidents have been recorded in the database. In an organization as big and complex as ours, around 300 less-severe accidents occur for each fatality. A world-class organization reports and investigates all accidents to determine trends and root causes. The Director of Army Safety's accident reporting analysis clearly shows that organizations that openly report accidents have fewer fatalities. Honest and open reporting indicates that the organization has a viable program and is trying to identify and resolve root causes of accidents. In our culture, accident reporting needs to lose its negative label. I have already made it clear that leaders will not use accident statistics in their personnel evaluations. This should be a clear indication that reporting is the right thing to do and that numbers will not be held against a leader. One challenge in using the automated accident-reporting process (https://crc.army.mil/Loss_Reporting/index.html) is personnel who do not have or use an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) e-mail account. By this time, all Army system users should have AKO accounts.

(b) Two of the three reported Class B accidents involved serious injuries resulting from motorcycle crashes. Most off-duty Class C incidents are sports and recreation injuries. On duty, six involved vehicle crashes, but most involved slips, trips, and falls. A good percentage of those are related to ice and slippery surfaces. One frostbite injury was reported last winter. These are risk factors for your associated winter programs.

(c) When vehicle inspections are performed, ensure that Government and private vehicles are equipped with tires appropriate for the season with required tread depth to minimize hydroplaning and increase traction on snow.

7. RESPONSIBILITIES OF HQ USAREUR/7A STAFF OFFICES, USAREUR COMMANDERS, AND SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS

a. Commanders of USAREUR major subordinate commands (MSCs), 1st Armored Division (1AD), Task Force Falcon (TFF) (Kosovo), and Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), USAREUR; and the Director, IMA-EURO, will—

(1) Develop a program that implements the requirements of this memorandum and provide a copy of the implementing directive to the USAREUR G1 (AEAGA-S) by 22 September 2006.

(2) Embrace CRM (<https://crc.army.mil/RiskManagement/default.asp?iChannel=25&nChannel=RiskManagement>) as a tool to prevent losses, regardless of the source, and base training initiatives on the new FM 5-19. The Army *Own the Edge* campaign message and tools should be used to integrate the process.

(3) Ensure that subordinate risk assessments are incorporated into the planning process with emphasis on the degree of research undertaken to uncover and develop the hazards, and in developing and executing the “5W” process (who, what, when, where, why) for risk-control measures.

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(4) Ensure that all new battalion commanders make an ARAP assessment (<https://unitready.army.mil/>) for their units within 90 days after assuming command, and make a followup assessment at mid-tour. Also ensure that brigade commanders are working with their battalion commanders to resolve issues and that systemic issues are raised to the appropriate level for resolution.

(5) Improve Under the Oak Tree counseling sessions:

(a) Counseling must be expanded to include NCOs.

(b) Leaders must learn how to persuade subordinates to “buy in” during counseling by discussing root causes and encouraging positive behavior.

(c) Leaders managing the session must realize that their risk perception may be skewed from the counseled individual, which requires research into the facts surrounding the activity through professional organizations and other methods.

(d) Use the traffic-point assessment and recordkeeping process of AE Regulation 190-1 for accountability and as an indicator of at-risk behavior. Organizations outside Germany should establish procedures that meet the intent of this process.

(6) Enforce the use of the ASMIS-2 assessment tool for all grades. The following will be approved only on successful completion of an ASMIS-2 assessment and driver-supervisor review:

(a) Requests for military leaves and passes from Soldiers who plan to operate a POV, motorcycle, or rental vehicle outside a 150-mile radius (which equals 2 hours on the autobahn).

(b) Military and DA civilian official travel when a TMP IFMS passenger vehicle, POV, motorcycle, or rental vehicle is authorized for use outside the garrison where the travel starts.

(7) Use hard-hitting media products available at the USACRC to further the *Own the Edge* program (<https://crc.army.mil/home/>).

(8) Comply with MILPER Message 06-035, which was issued under Chief of Staff of the Army direction (USAREUR leaders only).

(9) Prepare and submit leading-indicator summary reports of the following to the USAREUR G1 (AEAGA-S) by the first of each quarter beginning on 1 January 2007:

(a) Percentage of units currently safety-certified (Army in Europe Command Policy Letter 3).

(b) Percentage of battalion commanders actively engaged in initial and mid-tour ARAP evaluations with respect to the number meeting eligibility requirements.

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(10) Ensure subordinate organizations are reporting and investigating accidents according to the procedures in AR 385-40 and AE Regulation 385-40.

(11) Ensure that a viable individual and unit awards program is providing positive feedback and motivation toward desired behavior.

(12) Evaluate subordinate units in their execution of this campaign.

(13) Record and report lessons learned on safety-related issues to the USAREUR G1 and the USAREUR G3 (<https://lessonslearned.eur.army.mil/>).

b. The USAREUR G1 will—

(1) Revise Army in Europe Command Policy Letter 3 to—

(a) Make use of the ASMIS-2 assessment tool mandatory for all grades in accordance with requirements established in a(6) above.

(b) Expand Under the Oak Tree counseling to include NCOs.

(2) Integrate ARAP and unit safety-certification metrics into the appropriate USAREUR Strategic Management System metrics.

(3) Assess and improve the effectiveness of the Army in Europe Motorcycle Safety Campaign to incorporate and address emerging accident trends.

(4) Evaluate MSC safety programs for compliance with this memorandum.

c. The Chief, Public Affairs, USAREUR, will—

(1) Present and maintain a visible *Own the Edge* campaign through command information channels and local media.

(2) Maintain the concept of *Battle Buddy* and *Don't Walk By* as messages in campaign safety information and continue to emphasize *No Loss of Life* as the goal.

d. The Director, IMA-EURO, will—

(1) Institute the Army Driver Training Program or alternative measures to meet the intent of improving knowledge, skill, and behavior.

(2) Integrate and maintain a visible *Own the Edge* campaign through command information channels and local media.

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8. SUMMARY

In our transition to a more lean and effective organization, failure to reduce our losses will have important mission-influencing consequences. We are observing off-duty losses directly attributable to human performance. We must direct improvement efforts to influence motivation and emotions. Knowledge of behavior and risks, professional caring, and professional respect are keys to effecting change. Under the Oak Tree sessions remain the focus. *Own the Edge* is the vehicle. Together we can maintain a healthy and enjoyable environment for Soldiers, civilians, and family members through the winter months. *Don't Walk By*.



Encl

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Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

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USAREUR MSCs

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TFF

HHC, USAREUR

HQ USAREUR/7A Staff Principals

Dir, IMA-EURO

REFERENCES

Army Regulations

AR 385-10, The Army Safety Program

AR 385-40, Accident Reporting and Records

AR 600-8-22, Military Awards

AR 672-20 and AE Supplement 1, Incentive Awards

AR 672-74, Army Accident Prevention Awards Program

Field Manual

FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management (<https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/23137-1/FM/5-19/FM5-19.HTM>)

DA Messages

MILPER Message Number 06-035, Procedural Guidance for Evaluation Safety Requirements Impacting All Officers and NCOs (<https://crc.army.mil/Guidance/detail.asp?iData=299&iCat=571&iChannel=15&nChannel=Guidance>)

ALARAC Message 069/2006, Changes to Accident Prevention Awards Program, AR 672-74 (<https://crc.army.mil/AwardsProgram/detail.asp?iData=6&iCat=598&iChannel=28&nChannel=AwardsProgram>)

Army in Europe Regulations

AE Regulation 190-1, Registering and Operating Privately Owned Motor Vehicles in Germany

AE Regulation 385-40, Accident Reporting and Records

Other Army in Europe Publications

Army in Europe Command Policy Letter 3, Safety

McKiernan Sends Message #10-06, Memorial Day and “Owning the Edge”

Memorandum, HQ USAREUR/7A, AEAGA-S, 27 March 2006, subject: Army in Europe Motorcycle Safety Campaign